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through which national sovereignty may, on occasion, be lawfully infringed,
rules and procedures ensure that such infringements are only warranted in
limited circumstances. Balancing the concept of sovereignty with the protec-
tion of individual rights in particular countries can be a complex task. The
dispute in Tangoon and Samutra is illustrative in this regard.
I. THE ISLAND OF TANMUTRA
Tanmutra is a small island located just south of the equator in the Pacific
Ocean.' The inhabitants of Tanmutra, who are an ancient seafaring people
that adhere to the Tanmutran religion, have been settled on the island for
over a thousand years. In the past century, the Tanmutran religion has split
into two distinct sects.2 Approximately five percent of the island's population
adheres to an ultra-orthodox form of the religion. Adherents to this sect are
required to pray in mountain-top temples three times a day, believe in faith
healing, shunning the use of medicine, insist that the dead must be buried
under a pile of stones and under no circumstances can be incinerated, and
reject the use of most modem technology. 3 Conversely, those that adhere to
the non-orthodox religion pray while they are outdoors; allow the use of
medicines, alcohol, and technology; and permit either burial or incineration
of the dead.4
For over one hundred years Tanmutra was a French colony known as
French Samutra, but it achieved independence in 1990 as the Republic of
Samutra. Shortly thereafter, the country divided into two separate, independ-
ent, states: Tangoon and Samutra.5 Both nations were admitted to the United
Nations in 1991, and affirmed that treaties ratified by French Samutra in
1990 would continue in force. However, in 2010, when Samutra elected to
ratify the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Tangoon
declined to do so. 6 Followers of the ultra-orthodox form of the Tanmutran
religion settled in the mountainous regions of Tangoon where they could
more easily adhere to the stringent requirements of their faith. Upon gaining
independence, Raffliki Balthasar ("Raffiiki"), the first Head of State of
Tangoon, elected to govern his country in accordance with the principles of
the ultra-orthodox Tanmutran faith.
Since the separation of the two countries, Samutra has become a world-
class tourist destination. As a result, Canadian hotel giant Fairmont Hotels
I Compromis, 2.
2 Id. 13.
3 Id
Id. 4.
6 Id. T 5.
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and Resorts has been able to profit a great deal from the island's natural
beauty.7 This influx of foreign investment has allowed the citizens of Samu-
tra to enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world.8 Unfortunate-
ly, Tangoon has not received the same type of financial support from interna-
tional tourism. As a result, the country's political leaders must rely on,
among other things, the extraction and sale of natural resources to sustain
their fragile economy.9 De facto political and military leader Ishmael Bal-
thasar ("Balthasar"), the younger brother of Head of State Raffliki, has been
forced to deal with the challenge of leading this disadvantaged nation.
I. THE DEMON MINE
In 2007, the world's largest known deposit of cobalite was discovered on
the face of Mont Demon in Tangoon.10 Ishmael Balthasar took advantage of
this rare opportunity to raise capital in his country by granting the US-based
Geomin Corporation a license to mine and process the cobalite. As part of
this agreement, Tangoon provided workers from its National Service Pro-
gram to assist with the mining operations. While the mining was taking
place, Geomin CEO Clyde Barrett ("Barrett") temporarily moved to Tangoon
to ensure that the license agreement was being properly carried out.
After three years of very successful mining, geologists from Geomin dis-
covered a second extremely rich cobalite vein located just beneath the sur-
face of Demonville, a village located on the south face of the mountain. 1
After villagers declined Geomin's generous offer to purchase their land, Bar-
rett met with Balthasar to discuss how profitable this new site could be for
both Geomin and Tangoon. Recognizing his country's desperate need for
continued infusions of capital, Balthasar informed Barrett that he would find
a way to solve this problem.
III. CYCLONE KODO AND ITS AFTERMATH
On May 25, 2011, a deadly cyclone ripped through the island of Tanmu-
tra. Tragically, the unsuspecting citizens of Tangoon, specifically the people
of Demonville, were hit the worst.12 As a result of the State's religious be-
liefs prohibiting the use of modem technology, the citizens of Tangoon were
7 Id. 16.
Id.
Id. T 8.
10 Id.
1 Id. T 9.
12 Id T 12.
51
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not aware that the cyclone was coming. Furthermore, the State's religious
views lead them to refuse offers of medical assistance after the storm.
The government of Samutra requested an emergency session of the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council (UNSC) after disease from bodies in Tangoon
began to spread into their country. 13 While a draft resolution was circulated,
the United States indicated that it would veto any such resolution, as it feared
that it would constitute an unwarranted intrusion into the domestic affairs of
a member state without any real threat to international peace and security. 14
Circumventing UN procedure, which grants jurisdiction over such matters to
the UNSC, Samutra turned to the General Assembly (GA). The GA subse-
quently adopted Resolution A/RES/65/299 recommending the use of all nec-
essary means to deliver aid to the citizens of Tangoon.15
Following the GA resolution, the government of Canada sent an Iroquois
Class destroyer carrying armed forces to Tanmutra. After landing in Samutra,
the 120 armed commandos employed explosives to demolish parts of the
border wall and invaded Tangoon.16 Upon entry, Canadian forces encoun-
tered a blockade of Tangoon security personnel led by Balthasar. Canada
aggressively broke through the barricade, sparking a firefight between the
groups, resulting in the death of ten Tangoon security personnel. In the
course of battle, Canadian forces captured seven Tangoon nationals, includ-
ing Balthasar.17 During Balthasar's apprehension, Canadian commandos con-
fiscated his personal diary.18
Shortly after the armed conflict, the Canadian commandos arrived at
Demonville and immediately shut down the Geomin mining site, operating
pursuant to a contract with the government of Tangoon. 19 When Clyde Bar-
rett approached the commandos to protest this unauthorized act he was ab-
ruptly taken into custody. Both he and Ishmael Balthasar were transferred
back to the Canadian destroyer where they have been held for a period span-
ning 83 days.20
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The United States and Canada (the Parties) respectfully submit this dis-
pute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) pursuant to Article 36(1) of
" Id. 14.
I4 Id. 2.
' Id. 15.
:6 Id. 16.
"7 Id. 18.
18 Id.
19 Id. 19.
20 Id T 26.
52 [Vol. 37, No. 1]
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the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), and in accord-
ance with the Compromis submitted to the Court on 29 August 2011. The
Compromis and its attachments reflect an accurate account of the facts as
negotiated by the Parties. In accordance with Articles 26-28 of the ICJ Stat-
ute, and following the precedent of the Canada-US Gulf of Maine Case, the
Parties have agreed that the case be referred to a "special chamber" of the
ICJ, consisting of three judges. The Parties have agreed to take no further
action to enforce their positions with respect to this dispute pending the out-
come of this case. Finally, both States have agreed to fully and immediately
implement whatever decision the ICJ renders.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The United States respectfully asks this Honourable Court to decide:
I. Whether Canada's unilateral intervention into Tangoon follow-
ing Cyclone Kodo constituted an unjustified breach of interna-
tional law; and
II. Whether Canada, by proceeding without a warrant, acted law-
fully in apprehending, detaining and attempting to surrender citi-
zens of non-State parties to the ICC.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Canada's intervention into Tangoon violated several foundational con-
cepts of international law. These violations cannot be justified under the
United Nations' (UN) collective self-defence provisions, nor can they be
justified under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The General Assembly
(GA) had no right to authorize intervention, as the situation in Tangoon
posed no threat to international peace and security.
The apprehension and detention of both Ishmael Balthasar and Clyde Bar-
rett was unlawful in its disregard of norms of customary international law.
Furthermore, the prosecution of Ishmael Balthasar or Clyde Barrett at the
International Criminal Court (ICC) would be an unjustified extension of the
Court's jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
I. CANADA'S INTERVENTION INTO TANGOON WAS NOT
LAWFUL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The applicant will establish that the use of force against Tangoon consti-
tuted a violation of international law. It will then be demonstrated that the
53
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existing exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force could not be relied
upon.
A. Canada's actions violate fundamental principles of the United Nations,
including the prohibition on the use offorce and the preeminence ofsover-
eignty
There are a number of principles that all UN member states are required
to act in accordance with. 21 These principles reaffirm two of the most funda-
mental aspects of international law: (i) the importance of peaceful resolutions
to international conflicts; 22 and (ii) the significance of sovereign equality. 23
1. The prohibition on the use of force
One of the quintessential principles of the United Nations is that member
states are not to use force against one another. This concept is firmly en-
trenched in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (the Charter), which Canada,
Tangoon, and Samutra are all parties to.24 This Court has further affirmed the
importance of the prohibition on force by holding that it is also a principle of
customary international law. 25 GA Resolution 2625 (XXV), which clarifies
what actions amount to force, confirms that Canada's actions were exactly
the type of behaviour that is prohibited.26 In demolishing portions of
Tangoon's border wall and proceeding to break through the barricade set up
by Tangoon security personnel, Canada disregarded a fundamental concept
of international law.
2. The importance of state sovereignty
International relations are founded on the principle of national sovereign-
ty, with each individual nation being considered equal in the international
27 2arena. While some exceptions to sovereignty have been acknowledged,28
international law is still based on the idea that nation-states have the inalien-
21 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, CAN TS 1945 No 7, art. 2 [UN Charter].
22 Id. art. 2(3) and 2(4).
23 Id. art. 2(1) and 2(7).
24 Id. art. 2(4).
25 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits,
Judgent, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 195 (June 14) [Nicaragua].
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8082 (1970).
27 UN Charter, supra note 21, art. 2(1).
28 U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking
and Peace-keeping: Rep. of the Secretary- General, 17, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June
17, 1992).
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able right to resolve domestic issues and make independent decisions in their
relations with other nations. This idea is enshrined in Article 2(7) of the
Charter. The prohibition contained in Article 2(7) applies only to the UN,
and not to the actual member-states. Nonetheless, GA Resolution 65/299 (the
Tangoon Resolution), which authorized the use of all means necessary to
provide aid to Tangoon, was issued by the UN and thus contravened Article
2(7). No organ of the UN can pass resolutions aimed at individual states on
matters that are not usually regulated by international law, even if the resolu-
tions are norms of customary international law.2 9 The Tangoon Resolution
was aimed at one specific nation and dealt with the forcible provision of hu-
manitarian aid. The concept of forcible humanitarian intervention is not cus-
tomary international law, let alone a norm, and thus Canada's actions in
Tangoon contravened established legal principles.
B. The principle of collective self-defence does not justify Canada's un-
lawful entry into Tangoon
The UN has recognized narrow exceptions to the prohibition of force.
None of these exceptions, however, were engaged by the crisis in Tangoon.
1. Collective self-defense in the Charter
Article 51 of the Charter sanctions the use of force where a nation, or
group of nations, is acting for the purpose of individual or collective self-
defence. The present situation could only be one of collective self-defence as
Canada was a third-party to the dispute between Tangoon and Samutra. This
Court has previously acknowledged that collective self-defence under Article
51 is a matter of customary international law.30 As such, it is only justified
where: (i) the action was requested by an attacked state; (ii) the request was
made in response to an armed attack; (iii) the action taken was necessary and
the force used was proportional; and (iv) the action was reported to the Unit-
ed Nations Security Council (UNSC). 3' The limited scope of this provision
illustrates the emphasis that was placed on eliminating forceful actions when
the Charter was drafted. Only when all of these conditions have been satis-
fied may a country legally claim to have been acting in collective self-
defence. While Canada's intervention in Tangoon met the first and fourth
requirements listed above, neither the armed attack, nor the necessity re-
quirements were satisfied.
29 BENEDETTO CONFORTI & CARLO FOCARELLI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 165 (4th ed. 2010).
30 Nicaragua, supra note 25, 194.
" Id. %t 193-195.
55
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i. There was no armed attack committed by Tangoon capable of warrant-
ing a Canadian response
While no concrete definition of "armed attack" has been settled on, GA
Resolution 3314 clarifies what actions can appropriately be considered ag-
gressive.32 An act of aggression is a much broader term than an armed at-
tack.33 Accordingly, if an action is not an act of aggression, it cannot be an
armed attack. There is also a distinction to be drawn between an armed attack
and the use of force. Similar to acts of aggression, the use of force is a broad-
er term than an armed attack and thus where a country does not use force it
cannot be said that an armed attack was committed. As this Court held in
Nicaragua, armed attacks capable of triggering the right of self-defence must
be "the most grave use[s] of force".
In the aftermath of the cyclone, Tangoon neither used force, let alone the
gravest types of force, nor committed an act of aggression against any UN
member state. The unintentional spread of disease to a neighbouring country
does not meet the armed attack requirement needed to engage Article 51.
ii. Canada'sforcible intervention was neither necessary nor proportion-
ate
This Court has stated on multiple occasions that any use of force taken in
the name of collective self-defence must be both a necessary and proportion-
al response to the armed attack.34 The necessity requirement suggests that
force must be used as a last resort, which did not occur in Tangoon. The
spread of disease through the river flowing from Tangoon to Samutra could
have been halted by means such as damming the river or filtering the water
flowing into Samutra. This would have prevented the need to forcibly enter
Tangoon. The attack that Samutra claimed to be defending itself from was
the spread of disease, which is completely unrelated to the necessity for med-
ical aid. Regardless of whether or not entry into Tangoon was necessary for
the provision of aid, which it will soon be argued was not, any armed attack
that may have been perceived by Samutra could have been averted without
the use of force.
32 Definition ofAggression, GA Res 3314 (XXIX), UNGAOR, 29th Sess. UN Doc
A/9890, (1974) 143.
3 OLIVER CORTEN, THE LAw AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 404 (2010).
34 Nicaragua, supra note 25, 176; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons
(Advisory Opinion), 1996 I.C.J. 226, 41 (July 8).
56 [Vol. 37, No. 1]
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2. Other Charter exceptions to the prohibition of force
The only legitimate justifications for the use of force apart from Article
51 can be found in the other provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.15 For
these justifications to be engaged, however, the actions must be taken by the
UNSC, in an attempt to restore international peace and security. While the
UNSC did not pass any resolutions regarding Canada's action in Tangoon,
any such resolution would have been unlawful. None of the occurrences in
the aftermath of Cyclone Kodo threatened international peace and security,
as the provision of aid was a domestic issue.
C. Responsibility to Protect doctrine cannot be used tojustify Canada's
unlawful actions
The need for humanitarian intervention has not been recognized as a legit-
imate basis for the use of force or violation of state sovereignty. 36 The prohi-
bition on force and the preeminence of sovereignty remain pillars of interna-
tional law. These foundational concepts cannot be ignored in favour of nas-
cent doctrines or theories. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine ("R2P")
was first put forward by the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS).3 7 It was, however, narrowed substantially when
adopted by the UN in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit
and by the UNSC in Security Council Resolution 1674.38
1. Canada's actions in Tangoon were not carried out in accordance with
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine that has been endorsed by governments
The R2P doctrine to which governments have pledged support must not
be confused with what was contained in the ICISS report, or any other for-
mulations that have been advocated for.39 The doctrine can only authorize the
use of force where it is recommended by the UNSC. Even then it must be
used as a last resort.
35 UN Charter, supra note 21, at Chapter VII.
36 Nicaragua, supra note 25, 268; YoRAM DINSTEEN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-
DEFENCE 86 (4th ed. 2005).
37 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to
Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001) [ICISS Report].
38 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res 60/1, UNGAOR, 60th Sess. UN Doc A/60/1
(2005) TT 138-39 [2005 World Summit Outcome]; Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,
SC Res 1674, UNSCOR, 61st Sess. UN Doc S/RES/I 674 (2006) [Protection of Civilians].
3 Alex Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, (New York, NY:
Routlegde, 2011) at 9 [Global Politics].
57
13
van Wyck and Dick: Memorial of the Applicant
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2012
CANADA-UNITED STATES LA WJOURNAL
i. Action taken in Tangoon in the name ofResponsibility to Protect doc-
trine was not authorized by the Security Council
R2P doctrine does not layout a route for intervention that is not authorized
by the UNSC. 4 0 The international community explicitly rejected the idea that
the GA should be able to authorize humanitarian intervention where the
UNSC refuses to do so. While this concept was contained in the initial ICISS
report,4 1 it was purposefully left out when the doctrine was endorsed at the
2005 World Summit.4 2 Even if the situation in Tangoon could be considered
the appropriate type of crisis to which the R2P doctrine applies, which is
arguable on these facts, absent UNSC authorization forcible intervention in
the name of R2P could not be considered lawful. Canada's actions constitut-
ed an inappropriate attempt to manipulate R2P for its own desired outcome,
and must be swiftly condemned.
ii. Peaceful measures were not exhausted in Tangoon prior to the forcible
provision of humanitarian aid
Ignoring the requirement of UNSC approval for the use of force, the R2P
doctrine, as it has been endorsed, only permits the use of force where peace-
ful means of protection are inadequate.4 3 Not only could the spread of disease
have been prevented in a peaceful manner, but the aid could have been pro-
vided without the use of force as well. Airdrops could have provided food
and shelter to the civilian population of Tangoon, and would have been a
lesser violation of Tangoon's sovereignty. Additionally, non-violent pressure
could have been applied before any actual intervention took place. This was
the approach taken by the international community towards Myanmar in
2008 after the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis. By doing this, coun-
tries around the world ensured that, unlike Canada, they were not infringing
upon a UN member state's right to sovereignty.
2. Responsibility to Protect doctrine is not customary international law
Canada cannot rely on aspects of R2P that have not been endorsed by the
UN, as these practices are not customary international law. Article 38.1(b) of
this Court's statute recognizes that repeated state practice and opiniojuris are
4 Alex Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention"
(2008) 84 International Affairs 615 at 624.
41 ICISS Report, supra note 37, 16.29.42 Global Politics, supra note 39, at 9.
43 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 38, 1 139.
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required elements of customary international law.44 This Court has further
affirmed these requirements in several cases. 4 5 The use of force without
UNSC approval in the name of R2P does not meet either of these require-
ments. R2P has only been used to authorize the use of force on one occasion,
which hardly meets the repeated practice requirement.4 6 Moreover, states
have consistently iterated that they do not believe R2P creates any legal obli-
gations.47 As the conditions for being considered customary international law
are not met by any broader formulations of R2P, the doctrine cannot be used
in any manner inconsistent with UNSC Resolution 1674.48 Accordingly, the
recommendations made in the Tangoon Resolution authorizing the use of
force in accordance with R2P were illegal.
D. The General Assembly may only authorize the use offorce under its
Uniting for Peace Powers where there has been a breach of the peace or act
of aggression
In order to quell the fear of UN inaction posed by the UNSC permanent
member vetoes, the GA adopted the Uniting for Peace resolution. 4 9 This
resolution, however, only grants the GA the right to authorize force where
the UNSC is not exercising its primary responsibilities.50 Where there is no
threat to a breach of the peace and no act of aggression is present, the Uniting
for Peace Powers do not grant any additional powers.
While internal conflicts have been viewed as threats to international peace
in the past, this has only occurred in situations involving extreme violence,
such as civil war." Nothing that transpired in Tangoon threatened the peace
and security of the international community. The tragedy was not a violent
one, but merely a natural internal calamity that bore no threat beyond
Tangoon's borders. The Uniting for Peace Powers exist to ensure that the
permanent member veto is not used contrary to the primary purposes of the
UN. In authorizing the use of force in Tangoon, the GA explicitly contra-
" Statute ofthe International Court ofJustice, 26 June 1945, 33 UNTS 993.
45 Nicaragua, supra note 25, 186; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic
of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), [1969] ICJ Rep 77 (Feb.
20).
46 The Situation in Libya, SC Res 1973, UNSCOR, 2011 UN Doc S/RES/1973.
47 Concept Note on Responsibility to Protect Populations from Genocide, War Crimes,
Ethnic Cleansing and Crimes Against Humanity, UNGAOR, 63d Sess. UN Doc A/63/958,
(2009) at 3; Follow-up to the Outcome of the Millennium Summit, UNGAOR, 63rd Sess 98th
Plenary Mtg, UN Doc A/63/PV.98 (2009) at 24.
48 Protection of Civilians, supra note 38.
49 Uniting for Peace, GA Res 377 (V), UNGAOR, 5th Sess. UN Doc A/377, (1950).
'o Id. at 10.
51 Socialist Federal Rep. of Yugoslavia, SC Res 713, UNSCOR, 1990, UN Doc
SC/RES/713.
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vened two of the UN's most fundamental purposes: the preeminence of sov-
ereignty and the prohibition on the use of force.
II. THE APPREHENSION, DETENTION, AND SURRENDER TO
THE ICC OF ISHMAEL BALTHASAR AND CLYDE BARRETT
WAS AN UNJUSTIFIED EXTENSION OF ICC JURISDICTION
THAT CONTRAVENED INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The ICC lacks jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party states for ac-
tions taken inside the territory of a non-party State
International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction is governed by Article 12
of the Rome Statute, which states that the Court has jurisdiction over nation-
als of state parties and over crimes committed on the territory of state par-
ties.52 Canada's proposed surrender of Ishmael Balthasar and Clyde Barrett
lacks justification on either ground. Both men are citizens of countries that
are not parties to the Rome Statute. Furthermore the alleged actions of the
two men surrounding Cyclone Kodo took place solely within the territory of
Tangoon, a non-party territory. Accordingly, Canada's proposed surrender of
Ishmael Balthasar and Clyde Barrett to the ICC violates international law.
1. The Rome Statute does not provide justification for the surrender to the
ICC of either Ishmael Balthasar or Clyde Barrett
Principles of treaty interpretation, as expressed in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) dictate that a treaty shall be in-
terpreted in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty.53 The Rome Statute outlines ICC jurisdiction in the
aforementioned ways. As the United States and Tangoon are not parties to
the Rome Statute, the only legal basis for the transfer of the two men to the
ICC would have required the alleged crimes to have taken place within the
territory of a state that ratified the Rome Statute. The actions in question were
confined to Tangoon, and were thus beyond the reach of the ICC.
Where no jurisdiction exists, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the
nationals of non-party states if the UNSC refers a matter to the court.54 As
the United States is a permanent UNSC member with the power of veto, any
such referral would require American consent, which was not issued in this
52 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17 1998, A/CONF 183/9 , art. 12
[Rome Statute].
53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, Can TS
1980 No 37, 8 ILM 679 (entered into force 27 January 1980).
54 Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 13.
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case. Conversely, the United States actively objected to the exercise of ICC
jurisdiction in this matter.
Effects jurisdiction is the concept that alleged crimes perpetrated in a non-
party state may be punishable for the effect they have on state parties. The
Rome Statute is silent on this concept. To infer such jurisdiction for the ICC
would be contrary to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used by
the drafters of the statute. Canada's actions cannot be justified on such
grounds.
2. The Rome Statute excludes the principle of universal jurisdiction, pre-
cluding Canada from claiming justification for its actions on these grounds
Universal jurisdiction is arguably the most contentious method of estab-
lishing jurisdiction in international law.55 The inclusion of the concept in the
Rome Statute would have been highly problematic and controversial, as evi-
denced by its exclusion. 6 The drafters of the Rome Statute acknowledged
that, in practice, states rarely exercise universal jurisdiction. To secure ratifi-
cation, the document was intentionally drafted in a way that would not force
states into situations they regularly chose to avoid.57 There is no legal basis
for a court that can exercise jurisdiction over any citizen in any country.
Proponents of universal jurisdiction argued that the Rome Statute would
never receive the requisite number of ratifications without it, and were prov-
en incorrect.58 The United States submits that countries accepted an ICC
without universal jurisdiction precisely because Article 12 represented a rea-
sonable compromise between furthering justice while respecting national
sovereignty and norms of customary international law. Canadian attempts to
justify its actions based on an extension of the universal jurisdiction concept
must be categorically rejected.
B. Canada's detention and proposed surrender ofIshmael Balthasar is
unlawful in its disregard for the customary norm ofHead ofState immunity
and its contravention of the Geneva Conventions
Customary international law has long held that a Head of State is not sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. 59 This principle is widely confirmed
5 JOHN H CURRIE, CRAIG FORCESE & VALERIE OOSTERVELD, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND THEORY 463 (2007).
56 WILLIAM A SCHABAs, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 66
(2007) [An Introduction to the ICC].
5 Id.
5 United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1990) affd, 117 F.3d 1206
(l 1th Cir. 1997), citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe No. 700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1110 (4th
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by the case law of nations and was reaffirmed by this Court in the Arrest
Warrant case.60 The rationale behind this custom is the protection of sover-
eignty, respect among nations, and freedom of action by heads of state with-
out fear of repercussions.61
1. As de facto political and military leader of Tangoon entrusted to repre-
sent the country at the international level, personal immunity is validly ex-
tended to Ishmael Balthasar
While Raffliki Balthasar still currently holds the title of Head of State and
Government, defacto military and political leadership rests with his younger
brother, Ishmael. Personal immunities apply not only to the individual with
the official Head of State title; they extend to state officials who are entrusted
to represent the state at the international level, such as foreign ministers and
diplomats.62 As de facto military and political leader, Ishmael Balthasar's
responsibilities include interacting with the international community. Issuing
an official response to the communiqud delivered by Canada to the border
wall was one such example of Ishmael Balthasar being entrusted to represent
Tangoon. As a result, he is validly entitled to Head of State immunity.
2. Head of State Immunity is a recognized norm of customary internation-
al law which, when ignored, contravenes Article 98 of the Rome Statute
There are two relevant provisions in the Rome Statute that outline the sta-
tus of Head of State immunity before the ICC: Article 27 and Article 98.63
Article 27 makes it clear that neither the immunity of a Head of State nor the
official position of a suspected international criminal will prevent the ICC
from exercising its jurisdiction. 6 4 However, this provision must be read in
conjunction with Article 98, which acknowledges that obligations relating to
immunities arising either from customary international law or treaties may
conflict with an ICC request for the surrender of a particular person.65 From a
procedural perspective, Article 98 dictates that deference is shown to the
norms of customary international law, preventing states such as Canada from
Cir. 1987).
6o Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of I April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v Belgium), [2002] ICJ Rep 6.
Paolo Gaeta, "Does President Al Bashir Enjoy Immunity from Arrest?" (2009) 7 Journal
of International Criminal Justice 315 at 320 [President Al Bashir Immunity].
62 id.
Rome Statute, supra note 52, arts. 27, 98.
' Id. art. 27.
6s An Introduction to the ICC, supra note 56, at 79.
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surrendering immunized non-party citizens.66 It is a misguided overextension
to suggest that Article 27(2) applies to nationals of non-party states. 6 7 The
personal immunity of Ishmael Balthasar is recognized in customary interna-
tional law, and Canada cannot lawfully disregard it.
Recent decisions of the ICC do not, as some would argue, compromise
the correct interpretation of Articles 27 and 98.68 In the 2009 Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, the ICC misunderstood the application of Head of State
immunity to non-state parties.6 9 Omar al-Bashir is the current President of
Sudan, a non-party to the Rome Statute. On March 4, 2004, the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber issued an arrest warrant against him. It is important to note that the
ICC took this action after the UNSC directly referred the matter to the
Court's jurisdiction. This referral obliged parties to the conflict to cooperate
with the ICC and urged other states to do so as well. 70 There is some debate
as to whether or not the referral in UNSC Resolution 1593 made the Rome
Statute binding upon Sudan. 7 1 Regardless of the precise answer to this ques-
tion, the UNSC referral was one of the primary factors upon which the ICC
issued al-Bashir's warrant. 72 There has been no such UNSC referral regard-
ing the situation in Tangoon.
This view is strengthened by the ICC's approach to the similar situation
that recently developed in Libya. Following UNSC referral, the ICC issued
an arrest warrant for the now-deceased Libyan Head of State, Muammar
Gaddafi.13 Instead of echoing the approach in the al-Bashir case, the ICC
Prosecutor did not request that states other than Libya itself surrender Gadda-
fi. This implicitly acknowledged that their previous request regarding al-
Bashir was an instance of the Court overreaching its authority. Canada's uni-
lateral apprehension and detention of Ishmael Balthasar preceded the issu-
ance of an ICC warrant by 13 days. Even if Canada had prudently waited,
Tangoon's Head of State could not have been arrested without violating Arti-
cle 98. Balthasar's immunity, thus, remains inviolable under customary in-
ternational law.
6 Dapo Akande, "The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of
Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits" (2003) 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice 618 at
640.
67 An Introduction to the ICC, supra note 56, at 79.
68 Rome Statute, supra note 52, arts. 27, 98.
69 Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir (4 March 2009) (International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial Chamber 1).
70 President Al Bashir Immunity, supra note 61, at 330-331.
7' Reports ofthe Secretary-General on the Sudan, SC Res 1593 UNSCOR UN Doc
S/RES/1593 (2005) at preambular 2.
72 id.
7 S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (2011).
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3. Canada's treatment of Ishmael Balthasar violated Article 18 of the
Third Geneva Convention, rendering his personal diary inadmissible at the
ICC
The Geneva Conventions (the Conventions), which were ratified by Can-
ada in 1965, establish standards of international law for the humanitarian
treatment of victims of war. The Conventions apply in situations of interna-
tional armed conflict. 74 The flagrant use of prohibited force, as previously
outlined, amounted to an international armed conflict between Tangoon and
Canada. The Third Geneva Convention relates to the treatment of Prisoners
of War (POWs), and defines the term at length in Article 4.75 When Ishmael
Balthasar was captured as an enemy combatant in an international armed
conflict, he became a prisoner of war.
Canada's violations were particularly egregious with respect to Article 18
of the Third Geneva Convention.76 According to Article 18, all effects and
articles of personal use shall remain in the possession of a POW. Items such
as notecases, prayer-books, and writing paper have been regarded as effects
and articles of personal use.7 It follows that a personal diary would qualify
as such an item. Canada's seizure of the diary was thus in violation of inter-
national law. This illegally obtained evidence cannot be admissible at the
ICC. To admit it would contradict a general principle of law: ex injuria non
oritur ius - that no one is allowed to take advantage of his own wrong-
doing.78 The approach taken by this Court in the Corfu Channel Case is con-
*79sistent with this position.
C. Clyde Barrett was arbitrarily apprehended and detained in Tangoon
The aforementioned principles that govern ICC jurisdiction illustrate that,
like Ishmael Balthasar, Clyde Barrett does not fall within the authority of the
Court.
1. The apprehension of Clyde Barrett was not prescribed by law and is
therefore an arbitrary arrest and detention
The fundamental right to liberty, expressed in the UN Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
74 Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War, art. 2, 2949, Aug. 12, 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 135.
s Id. art. 4.
76 Id art. 18.
7 Id. art. 18 (commentary).
7 CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 118 (2005).
79 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
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(ICCPR), endeavor to protect individuals from arbitrary arrest or detention.80
The language most commonly found in these provisions is that no person
shall be deprived of his liberty "except in accordance with such procedure as
established by law."81 In this case, Canada not only used information in an
illegally-obtained diary to arrest Clyde Barrett, it did so before an arrest war-
rant had even been requested. Canada's unilateral detention of an American
citizen thirteen days before an arrest warrant was issued is an outrageous
violation of international law, and must be swiftly condemned.
2. Geomin Corporation's use of Tangoon's National Service Program is
not a form of slavery for which Clyde Barrett can be held criminally respon-
sible
Mr. Barrett's arrest and detention cannot be justified on the grounds that
he was responsible for the crime against humanity of enslavement. Accord-
ing to various human rights documents, including the ICCPR, no one shall be
required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 82 To apply this accepted
principle to the situation in Tangoon, the definition of "forced or compulsory
labour" must be clarified. According to Article 8.1(c)(iv), "forced or compul-
sory labour" shall not include any work or service which forms part of nor-
mal civil obligations.83 In Tangoon, the National Service Program qualifies
as a civil obligation, removing alleged criminal culpability from Mr. Barrett
or Tangoon's government.
Regardless of how Tangoon's National Service Program is characterized,
Clyde Barrett is not guilty of a crime against humanity as it is defined in Ar-
ticle 7(1)(c) of the Rome Statute.84 The ICC's interpretive guide, the "Ele-
ments of Crimes," outlines the requirements Canada must meet to demon-
strate that Mr. Barrett is guilty of the crime against humanity of enslave-
ment. Firstly, Canada must show that Mr. Barrett exercised power attaching
to the right of ownership over one or more persons.86 Secondly, his conduct
must have been committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack
80 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [ICCPR]; Universal Declaration On Human
Rights, GA Res. 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess. UN Doc A/810, (1948), art. 9 [Human
Rights].
s Human Rights, supra note 80.
82 ICCPR, supra note 80, art. 8.3(a).
83 Id. art. 8(c)(iv).
84 Rome Statute, supra note 52, art. 7(l)(c).
8 Official Records of the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the Internation-
al Criminal Court, First Session, New York, 3-10 September 2002,United Nations publication,
ICC ASP/1/3, at 6.
86 Id.
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directed against a civilian population. 87 Finally, Canada must prove the mens
rea element: that Mr. Barrett knew or intended that Geomin Corporation's
use of Tangoon's National Service Program would be part of a widespread or
systematic attack. 8 There is no factual basis for concluding that Mr. Barrett
knew or intended that his use of a government program would constitute
such an attack. The government of Tangoon rather than Geomin Corp admin-
istered the National Service Program. There is no evidence that Mr. Barrett
was aware of any of the details of the National Service Program beyond its
most basic features.
Canada's characterization of the National Service Program is misguided.
Tangoon is among the poorest nations in the world. It is logical to presume
that coordinated government programs like the National Service Program are
necessary in a country where jobs and sustenance are scarce. While these
working conditions may not meet the standard present in Canada and the
First World, it is reckless to impart these expectations on a nation with such a
vastly different socioeconomic structure.
CONCLUSION
In forcibly entering Tangoon and apprehending, detaining and proposing
the surrender to the ICC of both Ishmael Balthasar and Clyde Barrett, Canada
showed a repeated disregard for established international law. Sovereignty
and peaceful relations are the concepts on which international law is prem-
ised. No recognized exceptions to these norms justify Canada's actions. Can-
ada's actions recklessly blurred the purpose and scope of the ICC as defined
in its constitutive document, the Rome Statute. The ICC is not and should not
be regarded as a panacea. When states disregard its prescribed limits, it un-
dermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Court. The United States
respectfully requests the immediate release of both Clyde Barrett and Ish-
mael Balthasar. In addition, it is requested that Canada be sanctioned for
failing to obey established rules of international law.
87 Id.
8 Id.
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